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4PART A: OPTIONS
 Introduction
 The present study entitled ‘Development of surveillance technology and risk of abuse of
economic information’ presents the outcomes from a survey of the opinions of experts, together
with additional research and analytical material by the author. It has been conducted by ZEUS
E.E.I.G. as part of a technology assessment project on this theme initiated by STOA in 1998 at
the request of the Committee on Civil Liberties and Internal Affairs of the European Parliament.
This STOA project is a follow up to an earlier one entitled: "An appraisal of technologies of
political control" conducted on behalf the same Committee. The earlier project resulted in an
Interim Study (PE 166.499) written by OMEGA Foundation, Manchester and published by STOA
in January 1998 and updated September 1998.
 In the earlier study was reported that within Europe all fax, e-mail and telephone messages
are routinely intercepted by the ECHELON global surveillance system. The monitoring is
"routine and indiscriminate".  The ECHELON system forms part of the UKUSA system but
unlike many of the electronic spy systems developed during the cold war, ECHELON is designed
for primarily non-military targets: governments, organisations and businesses in virtually every
country. 
 In the present study it was requested to examine the use of surveillance technology systems,
for the collection and possible abuse of sensitive economic information.
 The initial data came from the following sources:
C The analytical results from the Interim study of this project entitled: ‘The perception of
economic risks arising from the potential vulnerability of electronic commercial
media to interception’ (PE 168.184/Int.St/part1/4). These results came out from a
procedure of data collection and processing based on a modified DELPHI method (to be
referred to here as "the first survey")[..]. 
C The outcomes from the following three brief,parallel studies, initiated by STOA in the
first semester of 1999, as contribution to this final study:
< "The legality of the interception of electronic communications: A concise survey of
the principal legal issues and instruments under international, European and
national law", written by Prof. Chris Elliot and published by STOA in April 1999 (PE
168.184/Part2/4)
< "Encryption and cryptosystems in electronic surveillance: a survey of the technology
assessment issues", written by Dr Franck Leprevot % Technische Universitaet Berlin and
published by STOA in April 1999 (PE 168.184/Part3/4)
< "The state of the art in Communications. Intelligence (COMINT) of automated
processing for intelligence purposes of intercepted broadband multi-language leased
or common carrier systems, and its capability to COMINT targeting and selection,
including speech recognition", written by Mr Duncan Campbell % IPTV Ltd % Edinburg
and published by STOA in April 1999 (PE 168.184/Part4/4)
 The procedure of data processing was based on a modified DELPHI method (to be referred
to here as ‘The final survey").According to this method the main key-points from the first survey
and the complementary studies were processed and a sorting examination performed. The next
step was the collection of the opinions of the experts on the main topics. This was mostly
achieved by direct interviews of the experts, with the use of a brief questionnaire. The views were
further processed and a convergence examination performed. The convergence procedure was
based on a recursive approach for the exclusion of the non-reliable data (Part B)
 The last step was the drawing of the analytical results and the policy options for action from
the European Parliament.
 The Part C of this report covers in brief the following topics: the developments in
surveillance technologies (physical and communications surveillance); the surveillance
technology systems in operation (mainly ECHELON Connection); the nature of economic
5information selected by surveillance technology systems; presentation of representative examples
of abuse of economic information; the protection from electronic surveillance via encryption; and
summary of the principal legal issues and instruments under international and European law.
Key findings
1. Comprehensive systems exist to access, intercept and process almost every important modern
form of communication.
2. Cryptography is an important component of secure information and communication systems
and a variety of application have been developed that incorporate cryptographic methods to
provide data security.
3. Nowadays almost all economic information is exchanged through electronic means
(telephone, fax, e-mail). All digital telecommunication devices and switches have enhanced
wiretapping capabilities. As a conclusion we have to consider privacy protection in a global
international networked society.
4. The importance of information and communication systems for society and the global
economy is intensifying with the increasing value and quantity of data that is transmitted and
stored in those systems. At the same time those systems and data are also increasingly
vulnerable to a variety of threats such as unauthorised access and use, misappropriation,
alteration and destruction. 
5. Proliferation of computers, increased computing power, interconnectivity, decentralisation,
growth of networks and the number of users, as well as the convergence of information and
communication technologies, while enhancing the utility of these systems, also increase
system vulnerability.
6. Compliance with rules governing the protection of privacy and personal data is crucial to
establishing confidence in electronic transactions, and particularly in Europe, which has
traditionally been heavily regulated in this area.
7. Although there are legitimate governmental, commercial and individual needs and uses for
cryptography, it may also be used by individuals or entities for illegal activities, which can
affect public safety, national security, the enforcement of laws, business interests, consumers
interests or privacy. Governments together with industry and the general public are challenged
to develop balanced policies to address these issues.
8. Since Internet symbolising global commerce, faced with a rapid expansion in the numbers of
transactions, there is a need to define a stable lasting framework for business. Internet is
changing profound the markets and adjusting new contracts.
9. Common technological solutions can assist in implementing privacy and data protection
guidelines in global information networks. The general optimism about technological
solutions, the pressure to collect economic information and the need for political and social
policy decisions to ensure privacy must be considered.
10. In a world of the Internet, the objectives of protecting both: privacy and free flow of
information must be under consideration.
11. An active education strategy may be one of the ways to help achieve on-line and privacy
protection and to give all actors the opportunities to understand their common interests.
12. Media could act as an effective watchdog, informing consumers and companies of what
information is being collected about them and how that information is being used.
13. Multinational companies could better negotiate for themselves across national boundaries
than governments can. Electronic commerce is unlikely to gain popularity until the issues of
notice, consent and recourse have been resolved. The market will force companies wishing
to participate in this medium to address and solve these concerns.
14. The growth in international networks and the increase in economic data processing have
arisen the need at securing privacy protection in transborder data flows and especially the use
of contractual solutions. Global E-Commerce has changed the nature of retailing. There were
6great cultural and legal differences between countries affecting attitudes to the use of sensitive
data (economic or personal) and the issue of applicable law in global transaction had tope
resolved. Contracts might bridge the gap between those with legislation and the others.
15. To operate with confidence on the global networks, it is required some sort of governmental
intervention to ensure data privacy.
16. There is no evidence that private companies from the countries, that routinely utilise
communications intelligence, are able to task economic information collected by surveillance
systems to suit their private purposes.
17. Information industry should be primarily self-regulated: the industry is changing too rapidly
for government legislative solutions, and most corporations are not simply looking at National
or European but at global markets, which national governments cannot regulate.
18. There is wide ranging evidence that major governments are routinely utilise communications
intelligence to provide commercial advantages to companies and trade.
19. Recent diplomatic initiatives by the USA government seeking European agreement to the
"key-escrow" system of cryptography masked intelligence collection requirements, and
formed part of a long-term program which has undermined and continues to undermine the
communications privacy of non US nationals, including European governments, companies
and citizens.
Options:
  
  The policy options for consideration by the committee on Civil Liberties and Internal
Affairs of the European Parliament, which came out of this study are:
  
<    It would be useful for the governments of the E.U. to: 
C engage in a dialogue involving the private sector and individual users of networks
in order to learn about their needs for implementing the privacy guidelines in the
global network
C   undertake an examination of private sector technical initiatives
C encourage the development of applications within global networks, of
technological solutions that implement the privacy principles and uphold the right
of users, businesses and consumers for protection of their privacy in the electronic
environment.
< The current policy-making process should be made open to public and parliamentary
discussion in member states and in the EP, so that a proper balance may be struck between
the security and privacy rights of citizens and commercial enterprises, the financial and
technical interests af communications network operators and service providers, and the
need to support law enforcement activities intended to suppress serious crime and
terrorism.
< Measures for encouraging the formal education systems of each member state of the E.U.
or European Training Institute / Organisation to take up the general task of educating
users in the technology and their rights.
< Definition of the transactions which must remain anonymous and the technical
capabilities of providing anonymity should be recommended.
< Drafting methods for enforcing codes of conduct and privacy statements ranging from
standardisation, labelling and certification in the global environment through third-party
audit to formal enforcement by a regulatory body.
< Protective measures may best be focused on defeating hostile Communication Intelligence
(Comint) activity by denying access or where it is impractical or impossible, preventing
processing of message content and associated trafic information by general use of
cryptography.
7< Any failure to distinguish between legitimate law enforcement interception requirements
and interception for clandestine intelligence purposes raises grave issues for civil liberties.
< Enforcement for the adoption of adequate standards (cryptography and key - encryption)
from all E.U. member states. Multilateral agreements with other countries could then be
negotiated.
< Drafting of common guidelines of credit information use (in each member state of the
E.U. different restriction policies exist). It must be clear how those restrictions could
apply to a globally operating credit reference agency.
< Drafting of common specifications for cryptography systems and government access key
recovery systems, which must be compatible with large scale, economical, secure
cryptographic systems.
< Enforcement for the adoption of special authorisation schemes for Information Society
Services and supervision of their activities by National Authorisation Bodies.
< Drafting of a common responsibilities framework for on-line service providers, who
transmit and store third party information. This could be drafted and supervised by
National PTTs.
< To proceed to regularly updating, the technical documents published by European
Institutions.
< European Parliament should carefully consider and possibly reject proposals from US for
the elimination of cryptography and the adoption of encryption controls supervised by US
Agencies.
< A course of action open to the EU is to require telecommunications operators to take
greater precautions to protect their users against unlawful interception. This would appear
to be possible without compromising law enforcement or electronic commerce.
< Annual statistics and reporting on abuse of economic information by any means must be
reported to the Parliament of each member state of the E.U.
8PART B: ARGUMENTS AND EVIDENCE
The last step of the survey was the evaluation by the experts of the key findings. These
key findings (19 in total) had emerged in the interim study and were complemented by the
findings of the parallel studies [3], [4], [5]. This was achieved by directly interviewing them by
means of a questionnaire and by telephone interrogation. Direct contact over the telephone was
entirely used during the convergence stage of the recursive approach that was followed, for the
exclusion of the non-reliable data and the clarification of some of the comments made by them.
Initially, 47 experts were contacted, but only the 30 of them have contributed to the final survey.
The experts, mainly holding executive positions in their organisations, are working for
Universities (47%), Industry (30%), Public Authorities (13%) and Research Centres (10%). In
the "Industry" category, all those working in the private sector, independently of the size of the
company, have also been included. Thirteen percent of the experts are women. The share of their
age is as follows: 27% between 21-31 years old, 43% between 31-40, 20% between 41-50, 7%
between 51-60 and 3% over 60 years old. It is seen that the vast majority of the experts are in the
age of 31-40. This is because, those belonging to this range of ages, are the main actors in the
information technology and at the same time are holding executive positions in their
organisations. The next greater percentage belongs to the range of 21-30 years old, which is the
generation that has really grown up within the information era. These persons have good
knowledge of the technology possibilities and threats, but are still taking decisions in a restricted
range. The ages between 41-50 are the third biggest percentage. They are those who decide, but
their knowledge in technology, especially in Information Technology, is restricted. The above
show that the sample of experts is well balanced, and their views contribute in a balanced way
to each key finding. Concerning the nationality of the experts, 80% of them are coming from the
E.U. and 20% from non E.U. countries, namely Cyprus, Norway, Switzerland and USA.
T The experts were asked whether they know that:
C Comprehensive systems exist to access, intercept and process almost every important
modern form of communication.
C Cryptography is an important component of secure information and communication
systems and a variety of applications have been developed that incorporate
cryptographic methods to provide data security.
The answers in excess of 90% of them were positive. They know (indirectly) that such
systems do exist, and they know or use cryptography as a means of secure
communications, e.g. in tele-banking applications.
T The experts totally agree (nearly 100%) on the fact that:
C Nowadays almost all economic information is exchanged through electronic means
(telephone, fax, e-mail). All digital telecommunication devices and switches have
enhanced wiretapping capabilities. As a conclusion we have to consider privacy
protection in a global international networked society.
C The importance of information and communication systems for society and the global
economy is intensifying with the increasing value and quantity of data that is transmitted
and stored in those systems. At the same time those systems and data are also
increasingly vulnerable to a variety of threats such as unauthorised access and use,
misappropriation, alteration and destruction.
C Proliferation of computers, increased computing power, interconnectivity,
decentralisation, growth of networks and the number of users, as well as the convergence
of information and communication technologies, while enhancing the utility of these
systems, also increase system vulnerability.
C Compliance with rules governing the protection of privacy and personal data is crucial
to establishing confidence in electronic transactions, and particularly in Europe, which
has traditionally been heavily regulated in this area.
T Ninety percent (90%) of the experts agree on the following points:
9C Although there are legitimate governmental, commercial and individual needs and uses
for cryptography, it may also be used by individuals or entities for illegal activities,
which can affect public safety, national security, the enforcement of laws, business
interests, consumers interests or privacy. Governments together with industry and the
general public are challenged to develop balanced policies to address these issues.
C Since Internet, symbolising global commerce, faced with a rapid expansion in the
numbers of transactions, there is a need to define a stable lasting framework for
business. Internet is changing profound the markets and adjusting new contracts.
C Common technological solutions can assist in implementing privacy and data protection
guidelines in global information networks. The general optimism about technological
solutions, the pressure to collect economic information and the need for political and
social policy decisions to ensure privacy must be considered.
C In a world of the Internet, the objectives of protecting both: privacy and free flow of
information must be under consideration.
C An active education strategy may be one of the ways to help achieve on-line and privacy
protection and to give all actors the opportunities to understand their common interests.
T The experts were also asked whether they agree or not with the following key-points. 
C Media could act as an effective watchdog, informing consumers and companies of what
information is being collected about them and how that information is being used.
C Multinational companies could better negotiate for themselves across national
boundaries than governments can. Electronic commerce is unlikely to gain popularity
until the issues of notice, consent and recourse have been resolved. The market will force
companies wishing to participate in this medium to address and solve these concerns.
C The growth in international networks and the increase in economic data processing have
arisen the need at securing privacy protection in transborder data flows and especially
the use of contractual solutions. Global E-Commerce has changed the nature of
retailing. There were great cultural and legal differences between countries affecting
attitudes to the use of sensitive data (economic or personal) and the issue of applicable
law in global transaction had tope resolved. Contracts might bridge the gap between
those with legislation and the others.
C To operate with confidence on the global networks, it is required some sort of
governmental intervention to ensure data privacy.
C Private companies from those countries are able to task economic information collected
by surveillance systems to suit their private purposes.
A percentage of 60 to 77 of them replied positively. Those who replied negatively ranged
between 15 to 22%, while there was a small number of 4 to 24%, that were unaware of
that particular point.
T Continuing the analysis of the results, it was found that the opinions on whether "the
information industry should be primarily self-regulated", share the same percentage, i.e.
approximately 42% positive, 41% negative, while the rest 17% couldn’t give a certain answer.
T Concerning the point that "major governments are routinely utilising communications
intelligence to provide commercial advantages to companies and trade", in one third of the cases we
had no concrete reply, 40% were sure that this is done, whereas 27% were sure that this is not the
case.
T Finally, with regard to the point that "recent diplomatic initiatives by the USA government
seeking European agreement to the "key-escrow" system of cryptography masked intelligence collection
requirements, and formed part of a long-term program which has undermined and continues to
undermine the communications privacy of non US nationals, including European governments, companies
and citizens", almost half of them (approximately 47%) had no clear idea on this. However, 33%
of the experts knew that this is the case and only 20% did not agree with the point.
As a result, we could say that experts do agree on all these points and they see that actions
have to be taken in order to balance the explosion of the information flow and the need for secure
communications. No additional points were proposed.
The graphical representation of the experts’ data and their responses, are given in the
following figures.
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PART C: TECHNICAL FILE
1.  DEFINITIONS
 
 Surveillance is the systematic investigation or monitoring of the actions or communications
of one or more persons.
 The basic born physical surveillance comprises watching (visual surveillance) and listening
(aural surveillance). 
 In addition to physical surveillance, several kinds of communications surveillance are
practiced, including mail covers and telephone interception.
 The popular term electronic surveillance refers to both augmentations to physical
surveillance (such as directional microphones and audio bugs) and to communication
surveillance, particularly telephone taps. 
 Data surveillance or Dataveillance is the systematic use of personal data systems in the
investigation or monitoring of the actions or communications of one or more persons.
Dataveillance is of two kinds: "personal Dataveillance", where a particular person has been
previously identified as being of interest, "mass Dataveillance", where a group or large population
is monitored, in order to detect individuals of interest, and / or to deter people from stepping out
of line.
 Surveillance technology systems are mechanisms, which can identify, monitor and track
movements and data.
 Privacy is the interest that individuals have in sustaining a "personal space" free from
interference by other people and organizations.
 Information privacy or data privacy is the interest an individual has in controlling, or at least
significantly influencing the handling of data about themselves.
 ‘Confidentiality is the legal duty of individuals who come into the procession of information
about others, especially in the course of particular kinds of relationships with them’.
 
 
2. SURVEILLANCE: TOOLS AND TECHNIQUES - The State Of The Art
1. Physical Surveillance
   Electronic devices have been developed to augment physical surveillance and offer new
possibilities such as [2]:
< Closed % circuit TV (CCTV)
< Video Coding Recorder (VCR)
< Telephone bugging,
< Proximity smart cards
< Transmitter Location
< E-mail at workplace
< Electronic Databases, etc.
2. Communications Surveillance
 Communication Intelligence (Comint) involving the covert interception of foreign
communications has been practiced by almost every advanced nation since international
communications became available.
 NSA (National Security Agency, USA), the largest agency conducting such operations as
"technical and intelligence information derived from foreign communications by other than their
intended recipient", defines Comint. 
 Comint is a large-scale industrial activity providing consumers with intelligence on
diplomatic, economic and scientific developments. The major English speaking nations of
ii
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UKUSA alliance supports the largest Comint organisation. Besides UKUSA, there at least 30
other nations operating major Comint organisations. The largest is the Russian FAPSI, with
54.000 employees. China maintains a substantial Signal Intelligence (Signit) system, two station
of which are directed at Russia and operate in collaboration with the USA. Most Middle eastern
and asian nations have invested substantially in Signit, in particular Israel, India and Pakistan [5].
 Comint organisations use the term International Leased Carrier (ILC) to describe the
interception of international communications. [5].
 The ILC communication collection (Comint Collection) cannot take place unless the
collecting agency obtains access to the communications channels they wish to examine.
Information about the means used to gain access are, like data about code breaking methods, the
most highly protected information within any Comint organisation. Access is gained both with
and without the complicity of the cooperation of network operators.
 Different activities for this purpose have been developed [5] like:
C Operation SHAMPROCK
C High frequency radio interception
C Space interception
C Signit satellites
C COMSAT ILC collection
C Submarine cable interception
C Intercepting the Internet
C Covert collection of high capacity signals
C New satellite networks
Apart from global surveillance technology systems, additional tools have been developed for
surveillance. The additional tool used for information transferred via Internet or via Digital Global
telecommunication systems is the capture of data with Taiga software. Taiga software has the
possibility to capture, process and analyse multilingual information in a very short period of time
(1 billion characters per second), using key-words.
3. THE USE OF SURVEILLANCE TECHNOLOGY SYSTEMS FOR
THE TRANSMISSION AND COLLECTION OF ECONOMIC
INFORMATION
 
 As the Internet and other communication systems reach further into the everyday lives,
national security, law enforcement and individual privacy have become perilously intertwined.
Governments want to restrict the free flow of information and software producers are seeking
ways to ensure consumers are not bugged from the moment of purchases.
 All developing communication technologies, digital telephone switches cellular and satellite
phones HAVE SURVEILLANCE CAPABILITIES. On the other hand the development of
software that contains encryption, a telephone which allows people to scramble their
communications and files to prevent others from reading them gained earth.
 
1. CALEA system
 
 The first effort to heighten surveillance opportunities (made by USA) was to force
telecommunication companies to use equipment desired to include enhanced wiretapping
capabilities.
 
 2. ECHELON Connection
 
 The highly automated UKUSA system for processing Comint, often known as ECHELON
system was brought to light by the author Nicky Hager in his 1996 book, "Secret Power: New
Zealand’s role in the International Spy Network". For this, he interviewed more than 50 people
iii
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who work or have worked in intelligence who are concerned at the uses of ECHELON. It is said,
" The ECHELON system is not designed to eavesdrop on a particular individual’s e-mail or fax
link. Rather the system works by indiscriminately intercepting very large quantities of
communications and using computers to identify and extract messages from the mass of unwanted
ones".
 ECHELON became well known following the previous STOA Interim study (PE 166.499)
entitled  "An Appraisal of technologies of political control".  In this reported to be a world wide
surveillance system designed and coordinated by NSA, USA, that intercepts e-mail, fax, telex and
international telephone communications carried via satellites and has been operating since the
early 1980’s % it is part of the post Cold war developments based on the UKUSA agreement
signed between the UK, USA, Canada, Australia and New Zealand in 1948.
 According to the Interim study (PE 166.499) of 1998, there are reported to be three
components to ECHELON:
< The monitoring of Intelsats, international telecommunications satellites used by phone
companies in most countries. A key ECHELON station is at Morwenstow in Cornwall
monitoring Europe, the Atlantic and the Indian Ocean.
< ECHELON interception of non-Intelsat regional communication satellites. Key
monitoring stations are Menwith Hill in Yorkshire and Bad Aibling in Germany
< The final element of the ECHELON system is the surveillance of land-based or under-sea
systems, which use cables or microwave tower networks.
 Each of the five centers supply to the other four "Dictionaries" of keywords, phrases, people
and places to "tag" and tagged intercept is forwarded straight to the requesting country.
 The STOA report 1999, prepared as contribution to this study, entitled "The state of the art
in communications intelligence (COMINT) of automated processing for intelligence purposes of
intercepted broadband multi-language leased or common carrier systems, and its applicability to
COMINT targeting and selection, including speech recognition", (PE 168.184/part3/4), is
providing new documentary and information evidence about ECHELON. In this is reported that:
< In the mid 1980s, extensive further automation of ECHELON Comint processing was
planned by NSA as project P-415.
< The key components of the new system are "Local Dictionary computers" which store en
extensive database on specific targets. An important point about the new system is that
before ECHELON, different countries and different countries and different stations knew
what was being intercepted and to whom it was sent. Now, all but a fraction of the
messages selected by Dictionary computers at remote sites are forwarded to NSA or other
customers without being read locally.
< A dictionary computer is operating at GCHQ’s (Government Communications
Headquarters; the Signit agency of the UK) Westminster, London office. The system
intercepts thousands of diplomatic, business and personal messages every day. The
presence of dictionary computers has also been confirmed at Kojarena, Australia;  and at
GCHQ’s Cheltenham, England.
< There are satellite receiving stations in Sugar Grove/Virginia, Sabana Seca /Puerto Rico
and Leitrim / Canada working also as ECHELON interception sites.
< New Zealand signit agency operates two satellite interception terminals at Waihopai
covering the pacific Ocean which are working as ECHELON interception sites as well.
 
 3. Inhabitant identification Schemes
 Inhabitant identification schemes are schemes, which provide all, or most people in the
country with a unique code and a token (generally a card) containing the code.
 Such schemes are used in many European Countries for a defined set of purposes, typically
the administration of taxation, natural superannuation and health insurance. In some countries,
they are used for multiple additional purposes.
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  4. THE NATURE OF ECONOMIC INFORMATION SELECTED BY
SURVEILLANCE TECHNOLOGY SYSTEMS
  
Advances in information and communication technologies have fostered the development
of complex national and international networks which enable thousands of geographically
dispersed users to distribute, transmit, gather and exchange all kinds of data. Transborder
electronic exchanges -private, professional, industrial and commercial- have proliferated on a
global scale and are bound to intensify among businesses and between businesses and consumers,
as electronic commerce develops. At the same time developments in digital computing have
increased the capacity for accessing, gathering, recording, processing, sorting, comparing and
linking alphanumeric, voice and image data. This substantial growth in international networks and
the increase in economic data processing have arisen the need at securing privacy protection in
transborder data flows.
 There is wide ranging evidence indicated that governments from UKUSA alliance countries
are using global surveillance systems to provide commercial advantage to companies and trade.
 Each UKUSA country authorises national level intelligence assessment organisatios and
relevant individual ministries to task and receive economic intelligence for Comint. Such
information may be collected for a lot of purposes such as:
 Estimation of future essential commodity prices, determining other nation’s private positions
in trade negotiations, tracking sensitive technology or evaluating the political stability and/or
economic strength of a target country.
 Any of these targets and many others may produce intelligence of direct commercial
relevance. The decision as to whether it should be disseminated or exploited is taken not by
Comint but by national government organisation.
 On the other hand there is no evidence that companies in any of UKUSA countries are able
to task Comint collection to suit their private purposes [5].
 The growth in international networks and the increase in economic data processing have
arisen the need at securing privacy protection in transborder data flows and especially the use of
contractual solutions. Global E-Commerce has changed the nature of retailing. There were great
cultural and legal differences between countries affecting attitudes to the use of sensitive data
(economic or personal) and the issue of applicable law in global transaction had tope resolved.
Contracts might bridge the gab between those with legislation and the others.
 Since Internet symbolised global commerce, faced with a rapid expansion in the numbers
of transactions, there is a need to define a stable lasting framework for business. Internet is
changing profound the markets and adjusting new contracts. To that reality is a complex problem.
 Internet is a «golden highway», for those interested in the process of information. On the
other hand since Internet symbolised global commerce could be  a tool of misleading information
and a platform for deceitful advertisement.
 
 Examples of Abuse of Economic Information
 
 Various examples could be mentioned about abuse of privacy via global surveillance
telecommunication systems (like ECHELON). A number of them is given in [58].
 Many accounts have been published by reputable journalists citing frequent occasions on
which the US government has utilised Comint for national purposes. The examples given below
are the most representative.
 
 Example 1:
 On January 15, 1990, the telephone network of AT&T company, in all the North-east part
of USA faced serious difficulties. The network NuPrometheus had illegally owned and distributed
the key-code of the operational system of AT&T Macintosh computer (Apple company). 
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  J.P. Barlow: «A not terribly brief history of the Electronic Frontier Foundation, 8
November 1990»
 
Example 2:
 On January 24, 1990, the Electronic Frontier Foundation (EEF) in USA, accused a huge
police operation under the encoded name «Sun Devil», in which 40 computers and 23,000
diskettes were seizure from teenagers, in 15 towns within USA. Teenager Graig Neidorf
supported by EEF, not to be punished in 60 years prison and 120,000 USD penalty. Craig Neidorf
had published in Phrake (a hackers magazine) part of the internal files of a telephone company.
 M. Godwin: «The EEF and virtual communities», 1991
 
Example 3:
 On June 25, 1998, in Absheim, an aircraft A-320 of the European Company «Airbus
Industries», was crushed during a demonstration flight. The accident caused due to dangerous
manipulations. One person died and 20 were injured. 
 Very soon, and before the announcement of the official report, in the aerospace and transport
Internet newsgroups, appeared a lot of aggressive messages against company Airbus and against
the French company Aerospatiale as well, with which Airbus had close co-operation. Messages
declared that, the accident was expectable because European Engineers are not so highly qualified
as American Engineers are. It was also clearly stated, that in the future similar accidents are
expected.
 Aerospatiale’s agents were very impressive with these aggressive messages. They tried to
discover the sources of messages and they finally realised that senders’ identification data,
addresses and nodes were false. The source messages came from USA, from computers with
misled identification data and transferred from anonymous servers in Finland. 
 In this case Aerospatiale has arguments to insist in that American BOEING implemented
one of the biggest misinform campaigns over the Internet.
 B. Martinet and Y.M. Marti: «L’ intelligence econimique. Les yeux et les oreilles de l’
enteprise, Editions d’ organisation», Paris 1995
 
 Example 4:
 In October 31, 1994, in USA, an accident in an ATR aircraft (of the European Consortium
Aeritalia and Aerospatiale) happened. Due to this accident, a ban of ATR flights for two months
imposed. This decision became catastrophic on commercial level for the company, because ATR
obliged to carry out test flights in fog conditions. 
 During this period, in Internet newsgroups (and especially in AVSIG forum, supported by
Compuserve), the exchange of messages was of vital significance. The arguments supported the
European company were a few. On the other hand, the arguments against ATR were a lot.
 At the beginning of January 1995, appeared a message from a journalist in this forum asking
the following: «I have heard that ATR flights will begin soon. Can anybody confirm this
information?» The answer came very soon. Three days after, unexpectable, permission to ATR
flights was given. The company learned this, as soon as the permission announced. But if they
have actively participated in the newsgroups, they would have gained some days to inform their
offices and their clients...
 «Des langages pour analyser la poussiere d’ info», Liberation, 9 June 1995
 
Example 5:
 The government of Brasil in 1994, announced its intention to assign an international contract
for the reconstruction of the overhead supervision of Anazonios. This procurement was of great
interest since the total amount available for the contract was 1,4 billion USD. From Europe, the
French companies Thomson and Alcatel expressed their interest and from USA, the huge weapon
industry Raytheon. 
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 Although, the offer of French companies was technically perfect and better documented, the
contract eventually was assigned to the USA company.
 This was achieved with a new offensive strategy used by USA:
 When the government of Brazil was about to assign the contract to the French companies,
American Officials’ (with the personal involvement of President Bill Clinton) readjusted their
offer, according to the offer of the European companies, asserted that, French companies occurred
the committee, an accuse which never proved. On the other hand, European companies have
arguments, that, the intention of the government of Brazil to assign the contract to the European
companies became known to Americans with the use of FBI’s surveillance technologies
(ECHELLON system).
 «La nouvelle machine de querre americaine», LeMonde du reseingnement no 158, 16
February 1995.
 
Example 6:
 In January 1994 Edouard Balladur went to Ryad (Saudi Arabia), it was certain to bring back
a historical contract for more than 30 million francs in sales of weapons and, especially, Airbus.
He re-entered bredouille.
 The contract went to the McDonnell-Douglas American company, rival of Airbus. Partly,
showed the French, thanks to electronic listening of the Echelon system, which had given to the
Americans the financial conditions (and the bribes) authorised by Airbus. This information is
collected and analysed by the batteries of hidden supercomputers behind the black panes of a
cubic building that is visible the node through the pines, when one rolls on the motorway between
Washington and Baltimore. Fort Meade (Maryland), head office of the NSA.
 The National Security Agency is most secret and most significant of the thirteen secretes of
the United States. It receives about a third of the appropriations allocated with espionage: 8 of the
26,6 billion dollars (160 billion francs) registered voters to the budget 1997. With its 20.000
employee in United States and some thousand of agent throughout le world, the NSA (which form
part of ministry for Defence since its creation in 1956) is more important than the CIA, however
much more known.
 Fort Meade contains, according to sources’ familiar of the places, the greatest concentration
of data processing power and math student in the world. They are charged to sort and analyse the
flood of data aspired by Echelon on the networks of international telecommunications. "There are
not only one diplomatic event or soldier concerning the United States in which the NSA is not
directly implied ", recognised in 1996 the director of the agency, John McConnel". The NSA
plays a very significant role as regards economic espionage", affirms John Pike, expert of the
information in Federation of American Scientist, which specifies "Echelon is in the heart of its
operations". In 1993, a direct president of the agency, the admiral William Studeman, had
recognised, in a confidential document, that " the requests for a total access to information do not
cease growing ", while at the same time the Soviet military threat grew blurred. Economic
espionage justifies in fact the maintenance of an oversize apparatus since the end of the cold war.
 Admittedly, Nicky Hager, who reveal in 1996 the existence of Echelon, said not to have "an
evidence that the military circles (terrorism, proliferation of the armaments, espionage economic,
note) became priorities for the NSA ".
 «Echelon est au service des interets americains», Liberation, 21 April 1998
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 5. PROTECTION FROM ELECTRONIC SURVEILLANCE
  
  Electronically managed information touches almost every aspect of daily life in modern
society. This rising tide of important yet unsecured electronic data leaves our society increasingly
vulnerable to curious neighbors, industrial spies, rogue nations, organized crime, and terrorist
organizations.
  Encryption is an essential tool in providing security in the information age. Encryption is
based on the use of mathematical procedures to scramble data so that it is extremely difficult - -
if not virtually impossible - - for anyone other than authorized recipients to recover the original
‘plain text’. Properly implemented encryption allows sensitive information to be stored on
insecure computers or transmitted across insecure networks. Only parties with the correct
decryption ‘key’ (or keys) are able to recover the plain text information.
  Encryption is the practice of encoding data so that even if a computer or network is
compromised, the data’s content will remain secret. Security and encryption issues are important
because they are central to public confidence in networks and to the use of the systems for the
sensitive or secret data, such as the processing of information touching on national security. These
issues are surpassingly controversial because of governments’ interest in preventing digital
information from being impervious to official interception and decoding for law enforcement and
other purposes.
  Cryptography is a complex area, with scientific, technical, political, social, business, and
economic dimensions.
  For the purpose of this report, ‘key recovery’ systems are characterized by the presence of
some mechanism for obtaining exceptional access to the plain text of encrypted traffic. Key
recovery might serve a wide spectrum of access requirements, from a backup mechanism that
ensures a business’ continued access to its own encrypted archive in the event keys are lost, to
providing covert law enforcement access to wiretapped encrypted telephone conversations. Many
of the costs, risks, and complexities inherent in the design, implementation, and operation of key
recovery systems depend on the access requirements around which the system is designed.
  The Global Information Infrastructure promises to revolutionize electronic commerce,
reinvigorate government, and provide new and open access to the information society. Yet this
promise cannot be achieved without information security and privacy. Without a secure and
trusted infrastructure, companies and individuals will become increasingly reluctant to move their
private business or personal information online.
6. SURVEILLANCE TECHNOLOGY SYSTEMS IN LEGAL AND
REGULATORY CONTEXT
  
   Europe is the site of the first privacy legislation, the earliest national privacy statute, and
now the most comprehensive protection for information privacy in the world. That protection
reflects on apparent consensus within Europe that privacy is a fundamental human right which
few in any other rights equal. In the context of European history and civil law culture, that
consensus makes possible extensive, detailed regulation of virtually all activities concerning ‘any
information relating to an identified or identifiable natural person’. It is difficult to imagine a
regulatory regime offering any greater protection to information privacy, or greater contrast to
U.S. law.
   As a result of the variation and uneven application among national laws permitted by both
the guidelines and the convention, in July 1990 the commission of the then-European Community
(EC) published a draft Council Directive on the Protection of Individuals with Regard to the
Processing of Personal Data and on Free Movement of Such Data. The draft directive was part
of the ambitious program by the countries of the European Union to create not merely the
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‘common market’ and ‘economic and monetary union’ contemplated by the Treaty of Rome, but
also the potential union embodied in the Treaty on European Union signed in 1992 in Maastricht.
  Directive 97/66/EC of the European Parliament and the Council of the 15 December 1997
concerns the processing of personal data and the protection of privacy in the telecommunications
sector.
 This directive provides for the harmonisation of the provisions of the member states required
to ensure an equivalent level of protection of fundamental rights and freedom, and in particular
the right to privacy, with respect to the processing of personal data in the telecommunications
sector and to ensure the free movement of such data and telecommunications equipment and
services in the Community.
  The protection for the information privacy in the United States is disjoined, inconsistent,
and limited by conflicting interests. There is no explicit constitutional guarantee of a right to
privacy in the United States. Although the Supreme Court has fashioned a variety of rights,
‘information privacy’ has received little protection [9]. 
  Outside of the constitutional arena, protection for information privacy relies on hundreds
of federal and state laws and regulations, each of which applies only to a specific category of
information user (such as the government or retailers of videotapes), context (applying for credit
or subscribing to cable television), type of information (criminal records or financial information),
or use for that information (computer matching or impermissible discrimination). Privacy laws
in the United States most often prohibit certain disclosures, rather than collection, use, or storage,
of personal information. When those protections extend to the use of personal information, it is
often as a by-product of legislative commitment to another goal, such as eliminating
discrimination. And the role provided for the government in most U.S. privacy laws is often
limited to providing a judicial form for resolving disputes.
 Privacy of communicators in one of the fundamental human rights. The UN Declaration,
International Covenant and European Convention all provide that natural persons should not be
subject to unlawful interference with their privacy. The European Convention is legally binding
and has caused signatories to change their national laws to comply.
 Most countries, including most EU Member States, have a procedure to permit and regulate
lawful interception of communications, in furtherance of law enforcement or to protect national
security. The European Council has proposed a set of technical requirements to be imposed on
telecommunications operators to allow lawful interception. USA has defined similar requirements
(now enacted as Federal law) and Australia has proposed to do the same.
 Most countries have legal recognition of the right to privacy of personal data and many
require telecommunications network operators to protect the privacy of their users. All EU
countries permit the use of encryption for data transmitted via public telecommunications
networks (except France where this will shortly be permitted).
 Electronic commerce requires secure and trusted communications and may not be able to
benefit from privacy law designed only to protect natural persons.
 The legal regimes reflect a balance between three interests:
  Privacy;
  Law enforcement;
  Electronic commerce.
 Legal processes are emerging to satisfy the second and third interests by granting more
power to governments to authorise interception (under legal controls) and allowing strong
encryption with secret keys.
   There do not appear to be adequate legal processes to protect privacy against unlawful
interception, either by foreign governments or by non governmental bodies [2],[3].
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  As the Internet and other communications systems reach further into everyday lives,
national security, law enforcement and individual privacy have become perilously intertwined.
Governments want to restrict the free flow of information; software producers are seeking ways
to ensure consumers are not bugged from the very moment of purchase. The US is behind a
world-wide effort to limit individual privacy and enhance the capability of its intelligence services
to eavesdrop on personal conversations. The campaign has had two legal strategies: the first made
it mandatory for all digital telephone switches, cellular and satellite phones and all developing
communication technologies to build in surveillance capabilities; the second sought to limit the
dissemination of software that contains encryption, a technique which allows people to scramble
their communications and files to prevent others from reading them. The first effort to heighten
surveillance opportunities was to force telecommunications companies to use equipment designed
to include enhanced wiretapping capabilities. The end goal was to ensure that the US and its allied
intelligence services could easily eavesdrop on telephone networks anywhere in the world. In the
late 1980s, in a programme known internally as ‘Operation Root Canal’, US law enforcement
officials demanded that telephone companies alter their equipment to facilitate the interception
of messages. The companies refused but, after several years of lobbying, Congress enacted the
Communications Assistance for Law Enforcement Act (CALEA) in 1994.
  CALEA requires that terrestrial carriers, cellular phone services and other entities ensure
that all their ‘equipment, facilities or services’ are capable of ‘expeditiously... enabling the
government...to intercept... all wire and oral communications carried by the carrier...concurrently
with their transmission.’ Communications must be interceptable in such a form that they could
be transmitted to a remote government facility.
   Manufacturers must work with industry and law enforcement officials to ensure that their
equipment meets federal standards. A court can fine a company US$10,000 per day for each
product that does not comply. 
  The passage of CALEA has been controversial but its provisions have yet to be enforced
due to FBI efforts to include even more rigorous regulations under the law. These include the
requirement that cellular phones allow for location-tracking on demand and that telephone
companies provide capacity for up to 50,000 simultaneous wiretaps. 
  While the FBI lobbied Congress and pressured US companies into accepting a tougher
CALEA, it also leant on US allies to adopt it as an international standard. In 1991, the FBI held
a series of secret meetings with EU member states to persuade them to incorporate CALEA into
European law. The plan, according to an EU report, was to ‘call for the Western World (EU, US
and allies) to agree to norms and procedures and then sell their products to Third World countries.
Even if they do not agree to interception orders, they will find their telecommunications
monitored by the UK-USA signals intelligence network the minute they use the equipment.’ The
FBI’s efforts resulted in an EU Council of Ministers resolution that was quietly adopted in
January 1995, but not publicly released until 20 months later. The resolution’s text is almost word
for word identical to the FBI’s demands at home. The US government is now pressuring the
International Telecommunications Union (ITU) to adopt the standards globally. 
 Since 1993, unknown to European parliamentary bodies and their electors, law enforcement
officials from many EU countries and most of the UKUSA nations have been meeting annually
in a separate forum to discuss their requirements for interceptingcommunications. These officials
met under the auspices of a hitherto unknown organisation, ILETS (International Law
Enforcement Telecommunications Seminar). ILETS was initiated and founded by the FBI. 
 At their 1993 and 1994 meetings, ILETS participants specified law enforcement user
requirements for communications interception. These appear in a 1974 ILETS document called
"IUR 1.0". This document was based on an earlier FBI report on "Law Enforcement
Requirements for the Surveillance of Electronic Communications", first issued in July 1992 and
revised in June 1994.
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 The IUR requirement differed little in substance from the FBI’s requirements but was
enlarged, containing ten requirements rather than nine. IUR did not specify any law enforcement
need for "key escrow" or "key recovery". Cryptography was mentioned solely in the context of
network security arrangements. 
 Between 1993 and 1997 police representatives from ILETS were not involved in the NSA-
led policy making process for "key recovery", nor did ILETS advance any such proposal, even
as late as 1997. Despite this, during the same period the US government repeatedly presented its
policy as being motivated by the stated needs of law enforcement agencies. At their 1997 meeting
in Dublin, ILETS did not alter the IUR. It was not until 1998 that a revised IUR was prepared
containing requirements in respect of cryptography. It follows from this that the US government
misled EU and OECD states about the true intention of its policy. 
 This US deception was, however, clear to the senior Commission official responsible for
information security. In September 1996, David Herson, head of the EU Senior Officers’ Group
on Information Security, stated his assessment of the US "key recovery" project: 
 "’Law Enforcement’ is a protective shield for all the other governmental activities ... We’re
talking about foreign intelligence, that’s what all this is about. There is no question [that] ’law
enforcement’ is a smoke screen"
 It should be noted that technically, legally and organisationally, law enforcement
requirements for communications interception differ fundamentally from communications
intelligence. Law enforcement agencies (LEAs) will normally wish to intercept a specific line or
group of lines, and must normally justify their requests to a judicial or administrative authority
before proceeding. In contract, Comint agencies conduct broad international communications
"trawling" activities, and operate under general warrants. Such operations do not require or even
suppose that the parties they intercept are criminals. Such distinctions are vital to civil liberty, but
risk being eroded it the boundaries between law enforcement and communications intelligence
interception becomes blurred in future.
 Following the second ILETS meeting in Bonn in 1994, IUR 1.0 was presented to the
Council of Ministers and was passed without a single word being altered on 17January 1995.(57)
During 1995, several non EU members of the ILETS group wrote to the Council to endorse the
(unpublished) Council resolution. The resolution was not published in the Official Journal for
nearly two years, on 4 November 1996. 
 Following the third ILETS meeting in Canberra in 1995, the Australian government was
asked to present the IUR to International Telecommunications Union (ITU). Noting that "law
enforcement and national security agencies of a significant number of ITU member states have
agreed on a generic set of requirements for legal interception", the Australian government asked
the ITU to advise its standards bodies to incorporate the IUR requirements into future
telecommunications systems on the basis that the "costs of providing legal interception capability
and associated disruptions can be lessened by providing for that capability at the design stage".
 It appears that ILETS met again in 1998 and revised and extended its terms to cover the
Internet and Satellite Personal Communications Systems such as Iridium. The new IUR also
specified "additional security requirements for network operators and service providers",
extensive new requirements for personal information about subscribers, and provisions to deal
with cryptography. 
 On 3 September 1998, the revised IUR was presented to the Police Co-operation Working
Group as ENFOPOL 98. The Austrian Presidency proposed that, as in 1994, the new IUR be
adopted verbatim as a Council Resolution on interception "in respect of new technology".(59) The
group did not agree. After repeated redrafting, a fresh paper has been prepared by the German
Presidency, for the eventual consideration of Council Home and Justice ministers.
  The second part of the strategy was to ensure that intelligence and police agencies could
understand every communication they intercepted. They attempted to impede the development
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of cryptography and other security measures, fearing that these technologies would reduce their
ability to monitor the emissions of foreign governments and to investigate crime. 
  These latter efforts have not been successful. A survey by the Global Internet Liberty
Campaign (GILC) found that most countries have either rejected domestic controls or not
addressed the issue at all. The GILC found that ‘many countries, large and small, industrialised
and developing, seem to be ambivalent about the need to control encryption technology’.  
  The FBI and the National Security Agency (NSA) have instigated efforts to restrict the
availability of encryption world-wide. In the early 1970s, the NSA’s pretext was that encryption
technology was ‘born classified’ and, therefore, its dissemination fell into the same category as
the diffusion of A-bomb materials. The debate went underground until 1993 when the US
launched the Clipper Chip, an encryption device designed for inclusion in consumer products.
The Clipper Chip offered the required privacy, but the government would retain a ‘pass-key’ %
anything encrypted with the chip could be read by government agencies. 
  Behind the scenes, law enforcement and intelligence agencies were pushing hard for a ban
on other forms of encryption. In a February 1993 document, obtained by the Electronic Privacy
Information Center (EPIC), they recommended ‘Technical solutions, such as they are, will only
work if they are incorporated into all encryption products’. 
  To ensure that this occurs, legislation mandating the use of government-approved
encryption products, or adherence to government encryption criteria, is required.' The Clipper
Chip was widely criticised by industry, public interest groups, scientific societies and the public
and, though it was officially adopted, only a few were ever sold or used. 
  From 1994 onwards, Washington began to woo private companies to develop an encryption
system that would provide access to keys by government agencies. Under the proposals %
variously known as ` key escrow', ` key recovery' or ` trusted third parties' % the keys would be held
by a corporation, not a government agency, and would be designed by the private sector, not the
NSA. The systems, however, still entailed the assumption of guaranteed access to the intelligence
community and so proved as controversial as the Clipper Chip. The government used export
incentives to encourage companies to adopt key escrow products: they could export stronger
encryption, but only if they ensured that intelligence agencies had access to the keys. 
  Under US law, computer software and hardware cannot be exported if it contains encryption
that the NSA cannot break. The regulations stymie the availability of encryption in the USA
because companies are reluctant to develop two separate product lines % one, with strong
encryption, for domestic use and another, with weak encryption, for the international market.
Several cases are pending in the US courts on the constitutionality of export controls; a federal
court recently ruled that they violate free speech rights under the First Amendment. 
  The FBI has not let up on efforts to ban products on which it cannot eavesdrop. In mid-
1997, it introduced legislation to mandate that key-recovery systems be built into all computer
systems. The amendment was adopted by several congressional Committees but the Senate
preferred a weaker variant. A concerted campaign by computer, telephone and privacy groups
finally stopped the proposal; it now appears that no legislation will be enacted in the current
Congress. 
  While the key escrow approach was being pushed in the USA, Washington had approached
foreign organisations and states. The lynchpin for the campaign was David Aaron, US
ambassador to the Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development (OECD), who
visited dozens of countries in what one analyst derided as a programme of ` laundering failed US
policy through international bodies to give it greater acceptance'.
  Led by Germany and the Scandinavians, the EU has been generally distrustful of key
escrow technology. In October 1997, the European Commission released a report which advised:
`Restricting the use of encryption could well prevent law-abiding companies and citizens from
protecting themselves against criminal attacks. It would not, however, totally prevent criminals
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from using these technologies.’ The report noted that privacy considerations suggest limit the use
of cryptography as a means to ensure data security and confidentiality’. 
  Some European countries have or are contemplating independent restrictions. France had
a long-standing ban on the use of any cryptography to which the government does not have
access. However, a 1996 law, modified the existing system, allowing a system of "tiers du
confidence", although it has not been implemented, because of EU opposition. In 1997, the
Conservative government in the UK introduced a proposal creating a system of trusted third
parties.
  It was severely criticised at the time and by the new Labour government, which has not yet
acted upon its predecessor’s recommendations. The debate over encryption and the conflicting
demands of security and privacy are bound to continue. The commercial future of the Internet
depends on a universally-accepted and foolproof method of on-line identification; as of now, the
only means of providing it is through strong encryption. That put the US government and some
of the world’s largest corporations, notably Microsoft, on a collision course. (Report of David
Banisar, Deputy director of Privacy International and Simon Davies, Director General of Privacy
International).
  The issue of encryption divides the member states of the European Union. Last October the
European Commission published a report entitled: "Ensuring security and Trust in Electronic
Commerce", which argued that the advantages of allowing law enforcement agencies access to
encrypted messages are not clear and could cause considerable damage to the emerging electronic
industry. It says that if citizens and companies "fear that their communications and transactions
are being monitored with the help of key access or similar schemes unduly enlarging the general
surveillance possibility of government agencies, they may prefer to remaining in the anonymous
offline world and electronic commerce will just not happen". 
  However, Mr Straw said in Birmingham (JHA Informal Ministers) that: "It would not be
in the public interest to allow the improper use of encryption by criminals to be totally immune
from the attention of law enforcement agencies". The UK, along with France (which already has
a law obliging individuals to use "crackable" software) and the USA, is out on a limb in the EU.
"The UK presidency has a particular view and they are one of the access hard-liners. They want
access: "them and the French", commented an encryption expert. They are particularly about
"confidential services" which ensure that a message can only be read by the person for whom it
is intended who has a "key" to access it. The Commission’s report proposes "monitoring" Member
States laws’ on "confidential services" to ensure they do not contravene the rules of the single
market.
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